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This same brief is filed in Docket No. 45382-2017 and Docket No. 45383-2017, in
response to appeals filed by the United States and the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. While their appellate
briefs are structured differently, the same issues are at play in both. Hence, for convenience sake,
Hecla is responding to both appeals in this Consolidated Response Brief, which is filed in both
cases.
I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This is another in a long line of efforts by the United States to claim water rights in Idaho

based, not on Idaho water law and not on any express reservation of water rights, but on
implications arising from reservations of land for various purposes by the United States. Here,
the reservation of land is the establishment of a Reservation for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe in the
nineteenth century. The Executive Orders and Acts of Congress related to the Reservation make
no mention of water rights. Nor do the contemporaneous historical records. The agreements
between the Tribe and the United States, and the Acts of Congress approving the agreements, all
recognize that the Coeur d’Alene Tribe relinquished all right, title and claim outside the
Reservation boundaries. Nevertheless, according to the United States and Tribe, this reservation
of land and cession of title to land of the Reservation, gives rise to dozens of different types of
water rights, from irrigation and domestic use, to commercial and industrial uses, to preservation
of wetlands, to instream flows both on and off the Reservation, and ultimately to establishment
of a lake level claim that would potentially control all water use in the Coeur d’Alene, St. Joe
and St. Maries basins. The lake level and instream flow claims are of particular concern to Hecla
Limited (“Hecla”), which led to its participation in this matter.

HECLA LIMITED’S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE BRIEF

1

Hecla has mining properties located on tributaries which drain to the Coeur d’Alene
River and Coeur d’Alene Lake above the Tribe’s Reservation. The off-reservation instream
flows and the lake level claims claimed by the United States, on behalf of the Tribe, are not
based upon any treaty language reserving the Tribe any water outside the Reservation
boundaries. Nevertheless, the United States’ off-reservation claims reach far upstream into
tributaries where Hecla’s facilities are located. The sole legal basis for the claim by the United
States and Tribe rests upon the theory that the reservation of land for the Tribe, impliedly and by
necessity, carried with it off-reservation water rights. Some of these off-reservation water right
claims exceed the natural flow of the tributaries and would prevent any use of the water by those,
including Hecla, who had established State law water rights for use of water in the tributaries
long before these reserved rights claims were asserted.
This is the second time that this key issue of off-reservation instream flow rights has been
brought before this Court. In 1999, the Snake River Basin Adjudication (“SRBA”) court rejected
off-reservation instream flow right claims filed by the United States on behalf of the Nez Perce
i

Tribe. See Order on Motions for Summary Judgment of the State ofIdaho, Idaho Power,
Potlatch Corporation, Irrigation Districts and Other Objectors Who have Joined and/or
Supported Various Motions, Consolidated Subcase No. 03-10022, November 10, 1999 (Nez
Perce Order), R. 826-874. The United States appealed that decision to this Court. The Nez Perce
Tribe even attempted to disqualify the presiding SRBA judge after he issued the Nez Perce

i

Order. See United States v. State, 137 Idaho 654, 51 P.3d 1110 (2002). But, this Court dismissed
that appeal as moot. Before this Court heard the appeal from the Nez Perce Order on the merits,
the parties reached a resolution of the case. In that resolution, the SRBA district court's opinion

:

was not vacated. The Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, was entered into between the
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parties, including the United States, State of Idaho, the Nez Perce Tribe and the various
objectors. See Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Public Law 108-447,118 Stat. 3431. No
off-reservation instream flow rights were granted to the United States under this 2004 Act.
Nevertheless, the United States has now renewed the same claim in the Coeur d’Alene Spokane
River Basin Adjudication (“CSBRA”) court; this time on behalf of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe,
asserting that the United States is entitled to hold federal reserved water rights for off-reservation
instream flows. The United States’ claim is even based on the same scientific theory espoused by
the same expert it used in the Nez Perce case, Dudley Reiser.
The United States’ instream flow claims, both on and off the Reservation, its lake level
claim, including a lake level off of the Reservation, its domestic, agricultural, commercial,

I

industrial and municipal claims, and its wetland claims all implicate the scope of the implied

!

reserved water right doctrine. This case raises fundamental questions of the proper interpretation
of the reserved rights doctrine, and application of the United States Supreme Court decisions in
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), and United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978). Hence, Hecla will respond to the legal arguments underlying all the United States’
j

reserved right claims and explain why those claims should not be recognized here, because the
legal principles underlying those arguments are inextricably intertwined with how the reserved
water rights doctrine applies to the claims asserted by the United States and Tribe that directly
affect Hecla’s water rights.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
This is an appeal from the CSRBA district court. The dispute arose when the United

States, on behalf of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, filed 353 claims to federal reserved water rights. Of
these 353 claims, 72 claims reached upstream and outside the boundaries of the Reservation to
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assert in-stream flow rights, on behalf of the Tribe, for fisheries off the Reservation. See
Appendix A, list of off-reservation instream flow claims. Hecla objected to the United States’
claims. R. 372-375. The State of Idaho, and many other objectors, also filed objections to these
claims. The subcases were consolidated into subcase 91-7755. R. 461-474. The CSRBA district
court then determined to bifurcate the proceedings so that the question of entitlement to a water
right was decided first. R. 461-474. If entitlement was found, then quantification of that right
would be the next step. This was the same procedure followed in the subcase involving the
United States’ claim on behalf of the Nez Perce Tribe in the Snake River Basin Adjudication. All
of the parties agreed to this bifurcation procedure.
The general course of proceedings is described in the CSRBA district court's Order on
Motions for Summary Judgment. R. 4310-4312, at Section I, Background. On October 21, 2016,
Hecla filed a timely motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support primarily
directed at the off-reservation instream flow claims asserted by the United States on behalf of the
Tribe. R. 2360-2363 and 2402-2424. Hecla also joined in the State of Idaho’s motion for
summary judgment. Id. On February 23, 2017, Hecla filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the
United States and Coeur d’Alene Tribe's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 2820-2846.
!

Hecla also joined in the response filed by the State of Idaho and provided additional argument
I

with respect to the off-reservation instream flow claims, the scope of the reservation of rights
doctrine, the scope of the United States’ trust obligation, the claim for irrigation water and the
lake level claim. Id. On May 3,2017, after oral argument, the CSRBA district court entered an
Order granting and denying the motions for summary judgment, in part. R. 4310-4333. The
CSRBA district court recognized a reserved water right on behalf of the Tribe for agricultural,
hunting and fishing, and domestic purposes on the Reservation. R. 4320-4323. The CSRBA
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district court held that the United States had not impliedly reserved water rights for other
secondary uses of the reservation, including industrial, commercial, water storage, power
generation, aesthetics, recreation and lake level maintenance. R. 4323-4324. The CSRBA district
court also held that the United States was not entitled to federal reserved water rights extending
outside the Reservation boundaries and denied the lake level maintenance claim as a matter of
law. R. 4324-4326,4328. On the same day, the CSRBA district court entered a Final Order
Disallowing Purposes of Use, R. 4301-4304, and a Final Order Disallowing Water Right
Claims, R. 4305-4309.
Various parties filed motions for reconsideration of the CSRBA district court's summary
judgment Order. On June 9, 2017, Hecla filed its opposition to the motions to reconsider filed by

i

the United States and Coeur d’Alene Tribe. R. 4368-4374 and 4375-4383. On July 26, 2017, the
CSRBA district court entered its Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Order on Motion to
Set Aside and Modify. R. 4373 and R. 4479. Notice ofAppeals were timely filed by the State and

I

other parties. Hecla, along with other parties, also filed a motion for permissive appeal of the
summary judgment Order. See Hecla Limited’s Motion Requesting Acceptance ofAppeal by
Permission, filed August 30, 2017. Those motions were denied, but this Court noted that the
issues raised by the interlocutory appeals may be addressed in these appeals. R. 4486-4491.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The CSRBA district court's Statement of Facts in the Order on Motions for Summary
Judgment relied primarily on facts recited by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. United
States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). That decision arose from an appeal from the Idaho federal district
court over a lawsuit between the State and the United States regarding the ownership of
!

submerged lands of Lake Coeur d’Alene. The Supreme Court held that submerged lands within

HECLA LIMITED’S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE BRIEF

5

;
|

the boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe Reservation belonged to the Tribe and were not
passed to the State upon its admission to Statehood in 1890. Id. However, the submerged lands
under the northern two-thirds of the Lake are State property, as the Coeur d’Alene Tribal
boundary crosses Lake Coeur d’Alene about one-third of the way up the Lake from St. Maries
and just below the mouth of the Coeur d’Alene River. No part of the Coeur d’Alene River itself,
or its tributaries, lies within the boundaries of the current Coeur d’Alene Tribe Reservation. In
addition to the facts set forth by the CSRBA district court in its Order on Motions for Summary
Judgment, Hecla believes that the following additional facts are important and undisputed.
A.

Formation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
The creation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was spurred, in large part, due to the

discovery of valuable mineral deposits within the aboriginal lands of the Tribe. R. 2347 (“The one
thing that has given them [i.e. the Tribe] trouble has been the fear of losing their homes. They
i

have watched the progress of white settlement in the surrounding county, the discovery of
valuable mines, the building of railroads, etc. etc.”); Id. (“It was feared in the early spring that the
great rush to the Coeur d'Alene gold mines would cause considerable trespassing upon their
reserve.”)
A reservation for the Tribe was originally created through an 1867 Executive Order.
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 265 (2001). The Tribe was not aware of the 1867

;

Reservation until 1871, and refused to accept its boundaries as too limited. Id. In 1872, the Tribe
submitted a petition to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs seeking negotiations on a reservation
boundary, asserting:
!

//
//
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What we are unanimous in asking, besides the 20 square miles already spoken of,
are the two valleys, the S. Josephs, from the junction of S. and N. forks, and the
Coeur d’Alene from the Mission inclusively. It would appear too much, and it
would be so if all or most of it were fit for farming but the far greatest part of it is
either rocky or too dry, too cold or swampy; besides we are not as yet quite up to
living on farming-, with the work of God we took labor too, we began tilling the
ground and we like it; though perhaps slowly we are continually progressing; but
our aided industry is not as yet up to the white man’s. We think it hard to leave at
once old habits to embrace new ones;for a while yet we need have some hunting
andfishing.
United States v. Idaho, 95 F.Supp.2d 1094,1103 (emphasis added); see also 533 U.S. at 266
(“we are not as yet quite up to living on farming” and “for a while yet we need to have some
hunting and fishing.”) Thereafter, Congress authorized negotiations with the Tribe to induce “the
tribes ‘to abandon their roaming habits and consent to confine themselves within the limits of
;

such reservation or reservations as may be designated for their occupancy.’” United States v.
Idaho, 95 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1095 (D. Idaho 1998).

i

In 1983, the United States and Tribe agreed on a Reservation of approximately 590,000
acres, Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1461,1463 (9th Cir. 1983), “considerably larger than the 1867
Reservation,” United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2000). The Tribe agreed to “cede
approximately four million acres of aboriginal land to the United States.” Id.; 533 U.S. at 266
(“Following further negotiations, the Tribe in 1873 agreed to relinquish (for compensation) all
claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that
negotiators for the United States agreed to set apart and secure” “for the exclusive use of the
Coeur d'Alene Indians, and to protect...from settlement or occupancy by other persons.”)

i

(emphasis added). President Grant’s 1873 Executive Order set the northern boundary directly
across the lake and confirmed the boundaries of the Reservation. 533 U.S. at 266. This Executive
Order did not identify fishing or fish habitat (on or off reservation) as a purpose of the

!

HECLA LIMITED’S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE BRIEF

7

Reservation.1 The 1873 agreement required approval from Congress “before it became binding
on the parties.” Id.
The 1873 agreement was never ratified by Congress. In 1885, concerned about “white
settlement pressure,” the Tribe contacted the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, requesting
confirmation of the 1873 agreement. 533 U.S. at 267; see also R. 2336-2337 (Non-Indian interest
in forest lands of northern Idaho predated the 1880s, but accelerated with the emergence of
mining towns along the South Fork of the Coeur d’Alene River); R. 2347 (“The one thing that
has given them [i.e. the Tribe] trouble has been the fear of losing their homes. They have
watched the progress of white settlement in the surrounding county, the discovery of valuable
mines, the building of railroads, etc. etc.”); Id. (“It was feared in the early spring that the great
rush to the Coeur d’Alene gold mines would cause considerable trespassing upon their reserve.”)
Seeking to “extinguish the Tribe's aboriginal title to lands outside of the reservation,” Congress
authorized additional negotiations in 1887. 533 U.S. at 267 (emphasis added). Among the area
i

that the United States sought to acquire in 1887, was land with mineral ledges and timber as well
as “a magnificent sheet of water, the Coeur d’Alene Lake.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1109, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1890).
In 1887, the Tribe agreed to cede
all right, title, and claim which they now have, or ever had, to all lands in said
Territories [Washington, Idaho, and Montana] and elsewhere, except the portion
of land within the boundaries of their present reservation in the Territory of Idaho,
known as the Coeur d'Alene Reservation.

1 This is not to say that fishing had not been important to the Tribe. United States v. Idaho, 95 F.Supp.2d 1094,
1103-04 (D. Idaho 1998) (discussing the importance of waterways and fishing to the Tribe). The issue here,
however, is the intent of the United States in setting aside the reservation of land for the Tribe in the 1873, 1887 and
1889 agreements. Nothing in any historical documents relating to the treaties and agreements with the Tribe
evidence any intent on the part of Congress to set aside land or water for fishing or fish habitat. Instead, a primary
intent of setting aside the reservation was to allow further development of mineral resources off the reservation something that would require development of the area’s water resources. Infra.
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Id. In return, the United States promised to compensate the Tribe, and agreed that:
in consideration of the foregoing cession and agreements... the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation shall be held forever as Indian land and as homes for the Coeur
d'Alene Indians...and no part of said reservation shall ever be sold, occupied, open
to white settlement, or otherwise disposed of without the consent of the Indians
residing on said reservation.
533 U.S. at 267-68. The 1887 agreement was not “binding on either party until ratified by
Congress.” Id. As with the 1873 agreement, nothing in the 1887 agreement stated or implied that

j

water rights, fishing or fish habitat were purposes of the Reservation or that any off-reservation
water rights or fishing rights were preserved.
The Reservation identified in the 1873 and 1887 agreements included “the vast majority

!
!

of the Lake” and valuable mineral deposits in the area. 210 F.3d at 1070; 533 U.S. at 268 (“the
reservation appears to embrace all the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d’Alene, except a very
small fragment.”) While the 1887 agreement was pending before Congress, the United States

!
;

received “pressure to open up at least part of the reservation to the public (particularly the
Lake).” 210 F.3d at 1070. This non-agricultural land was very valuable to white settlers for its
timber and mineral deposits. R. 2349 (“There is great eagerness on the part of the whites to

!

locate mining claims on the mineral portion of the reserve...and we found mining claims
numerously staked off...and in some cases notices posted.”); R. 2349-2350 (“These mining
prospectors are constantly on this portion of the reserve, and it seems next to impossible to keep
them off”) On the other hand, mineral deposits had little value to the Tribe. R. 2349-2350.
Instead of acting on the prior agreements, Congress authorized further negotiations with
the Tribe. R. 2359 (January 23,1888 Senate Resolution directing the Secretary of Interior to
consider whether “it is advisable to throw any portion ofsuch reservation open to occupation
and settlement under the mineral laws of the United States”) (emphasis added); 210 F.3d at
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1071; 533 U.S. at 269 (The “northern end of said reservation, is valuable and necessary to the
citizens of the United States for sundry reasons” including that “It contains numerous, extensive,
and valuable mineral ledges.”); 210 F.3d at 1077 (Congress authorized new negotiations in 1889
“with few limitations aside from an instruction to acquire non-agricultural lands.”)
Following further negotiations, the Tribe agreed, in 1889, to “cede the northern portion of
the reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene, in exchange for
$500,000.” 533 U.S. at 269-70; see also R. 2354 (“The commissioners report that they held
frequent councils with the Indians, explored the mineral portions of the reservation lying in the
northern part thereof, and finally on September 9, 1889, concluded an agreement with the
Indians whereby they cede and relinquish to the United States a very considerable portion of
their reservation, valuable chiefly for mineral and timber upon terms advantageous as they
believe to the Indians and the Government.”) This 1889 agreement made no mention of water
rights or fishing.
Congress ratified the 1887 and 1889 agreements through the Act of 1891, which
provided:
I

For the consideration hereinafter stated the said Coeur d'Alene Indians hereby
cede, grant, relinquish, and quitclaim to the United States all right, title, and claim
which they now have, or ever had, to all lands...except...the Coeur d'Alene
Reservation.
533 U.S. at 271 \ Andrus, supra, 720 F.2d at 1465. This Act of Congress made no mention of
water rights, lake level, instream flows or fisheries.
B.

Litigation Regarding the Scope of the Reservation.
In Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983), the Tribe challenged the State of

Idaho’s use of former reservation lands that had been acquired by the State in 1908. The patent
conveying the land to the State included a condition that “the lands are to be by said state held,
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used, and maintained solely as a public park,...the title to revert to the United States...absolutely
if the said lands...shall not be...so used and maintained by the state.” Id. at 1465. When the State
began a private cottage leasing program, the Tribe and United States asserted that leasing the
land violated that condition. Id. at 1462.
The question before the court there was whether the United States had retained any
beneficial interest for the Tribe. Id. at 1464. To make that determination, the court examined at
length the language necessary to demonstrate the intent to extinguish a Tribe’s interest in lands
or to diminish the size of a reservation. The court held that language such as “cede, surrender,
grant, and convey” is “precisely suited to diminish reservation boundaries.” Id. at 1466. That
conclusion is important here because all the cessions by the Tribe and the 1891 Act of Congress
!

agreed that the Tribe did thereby “cede, grant, relinquish, and quitclaim.. .all right, title and claim
which they now have, or even have had” to the lands off the Reservation. 533 U.S. at 271.

j

Likewise, in the Lake case, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Tribe agreed to “reduce” their
aboriginal lands “and extinguish[] aboriginal title” to lands outside of the reservation. Id. at 276.
None of these prior decisions addressed water rights for the Reservation. Both decisions
did, however, address the important issue before this Court and held that the Tribe had agreed to
cede all right, title and claim to lands outside the Reservation.
III.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL2

Whether the district court erred in holding that hunting and fishing are primary

purposes of the Executive Order establishing the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation?

i

2 These were all issues raised by Hecla in its motion requesting acceptance of appeal by permission. Hecla Limited’s
Motion Requesting Acceptance ofAppeal by Permission, filed August 30, 2017.
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2.

Whether the district court erred in concluding that hunting and fishing associated

with the Reservation constitutes a primary purpose of the Reservation within the meaning of the
United States v. New Mexico that would give rise to a reserved water right?
3.

Whether the district court erred in failing to determine whether or not the primary

purpose of the Reservation would be entirely defeated without a water right for hunting and
fishing as required by the United States v. New Mexico?
4.

Whether the district court erred in deferring the question of whether or not a water

right is necessary for the purpose of the Reservation to the quantification stage of the
proceedings.
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an Order granting summary judgment, “the Court applies the same
standard of review as that used by the district court when originally ruling on the motion.”
Potlatch Corp. v. U.S., 134 Idaho 916, 919,12 P.3d 1260,1263 (2000). “Summary judgment is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions
!j

for summary judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must

!

evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits.” Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d

i

102, 107 (2010).
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of
material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harris v. State Dept, of
Health, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992).
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Although a motion is construed in favor of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party
may not rest upon mere allegations or denials. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 770, 820 P.2d
360, 365 (1991). Immaterial issues of fact do not preclude the granting of summary judgment.
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Dosen, 144 Idaho 611,167 P.3d 748 (2006). If the moving party asserts that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “produce
evidence by way of deposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and
establish a genuine issue of material fact.” McCoy, supra at 770. Conclusory assertions
unsupported by specific facts do not create a genuine issue of material fact. Mareci v. Coeur
d'Alene School Dist. No. 271,150 Idaho 740,250 P.3d 791 (2011). Mere speculation, or a
scintilla of evidence, is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. McCoy, 120
Idaho at 769; Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.3d 303
(2000). In the absence of genuine disputed issues of material fact, only questions of law remain
and the Court exercises free review. Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701,249 P.3d 1156 (2011).
This Court has held that interpretation of a Treaty involves a legal question for the Court
rather than a question of fact, stating:
Treaty interpretation is similar to contract interpretation. Bonnanno v. United
States, 12 Cl.Ct. 769, 111 (1987). However, unlike contract interpretation, the
interpretation of a treaty, including an Indian treaty, is a question of law for a
court to decide. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 758 F.Supp. 107,
111 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d
638, 643 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1986)). The examination of a treaty’s negotiating history
and purpose does not render its interpretation a matter of fact but merely serves as
an aid to the legal determination which is at the heart of all treaty interpretation.
Bonanno, 12 C.Ct. at 772.
Pocatello v. State, 145 Idaho 497, 505, 180 P.3d 1048 (2008).
//
//
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VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

Winters Doctrine and Interpretation of Indian Treaties.
The United States’ Notices of Claim assert, as a basis for each claim, “the doctrine of

federal reserved water rights articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Winters v. United
States...and its progeny, as well as the operative documents and circumstances surrounding the
creation of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.”3 R. 363.
In Winters, the question before the Court was whether Congress had intended to reserve
irrigation water when it set aside the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564 (1908). The treaty and supporting documents were silent as to the availability of
irrigation water. Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress had impliedly intended to reserve

i

water when it set aside the reservation so that the tribes would “become a pastoral and civilized
people” on land that was “arid and without irrigation.” Id. at 576. The Court concluded, “it
would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress destroyed the reservation and took from
the Indians the consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren waste - took from them the

i

means of continuing their old habits, yet did not leave them the power to change to new ones.”
Id. at 577. From this decision, the Winters, or federal reserved water rights doctrine, came into
being. Under Winters, a court can imply an intent to reserve water rights incidental to the
reservation of land where that water was necessary to put the land to its intended use.
;

The court in Winters concluded that in the “interpretation of agreements and treaties with
the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.” Id. at
576. This is primarily because “the Indians were [not] alert to exclude by formal words every
inference which might militate against or defeat the declared purpose of themselves and the

3 Each of the Notices of Claim for the various off-reservation instream flow claims identify the “Basis of Claim” as
the Winters doctrine. R. 363.
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Government.” Id. at 577; see also Oregon Dept, ofFish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473
U.S. 753, 774 (1985) (legal ambiguities in treaties are “resolved to the benefit of the Indians”).
Winters is not an open door for the United States to demand water. Implied reservation of
water depends on finding the necessary implication at the time the land was reserved. “[CJourts
cannot ignore plain language that, viewed in historical context and given a ‘fair appraisal, clearly
runs counter to a tribe’s later claims.’” Oregon Dept, ofFish & Wildlife, 473 U.S. at 774;
I
Andrus, 720 F.2d at 1464 (“the general rule [of interpretation] does not command a
determination that reservation status survives in the face of congressionally manifested intent to
the contrary.”) “Indian treaties cannot be re-written or expanded beyond their clear terms to
!

remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the asserted understanding of the parties.” Choctaw
Nation ofIndians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943); United States v. Choctaw Nation,

;

179 U.S. 494 (1900) (“the Court cannot employ any ‘notion of equity or general convenience, or
substantial justice,’ to ‘incorporate into an Indian treaty something that was inconsistent with the
clear import of its words.’”)
!
I

The Winters doctrine has been extended to apply to other federal land reservations, many
of which have come before this Court. See Section VI.B., infra. However, because the Winters
reserved rights doctrine is a tool to imply what the United States actually intended at the time of
its reservation of land, it has been exercised only within the narrowest boundaries and only when
necessary to secure the “primary purpose” of the reservation of land. Cappaert v. United States,
426 U.S. 128,139 (1976) (“In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government intended to
reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously
unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was
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created.”) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained in United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696, 701 (1978):
The Court has previously concluded that Congress, in giving the President the
power to reserve portions of the federal domain for specific federal purposes,
impliedly authorized him to reserve “appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” While many of the
contours of what has come to be called the “implied-reservation-of-water
doctrine” remain unspecified, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that
Congress reserved “only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation, no more. ” Each time this Court has applied the
“implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,” it has carefully examined both the
asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved,
and concluded that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be
entirely defeated.

i

(emphasis added); see also Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143 (“the implied-reservation-of-water-rights
doctrine is based on the necessity of waterfor the purpose of the federal reservation. ”)
!

(emphasis added).
This implied reservation of water must be carefully balanced against Congress’ and the
courts’ repeated recognition that State water law generally controls the acquisition, ownership
and distribution of water. See e.g. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). There, the
Supreme Court observed, in a quote worth preserving in full:
Perhaps the most eloquent expression of the need to observe state water law is
found in the Senate Report on the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a),
which subjects the United States to state-court jurisdiction for general stream
adjudications:
“In the arid Western States, for more than 80 years, the law has been the water
above and beneath the surface of the ground belongs to the public, and the
right to the use thereof is to be acquired from the State in which it is found,
which State is vested with the primary control thereof.”
!

438 U.S. at 678.
“Careful examination” of a claim for a federal reserved water right is necessary to
confirm that the claimed water is a “primary use” and is “necessary to fulfill the very purposes”
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of the reservation of land. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 699. However, “where water is only valuable

i

for a secondary use of the reservation... there arises the contrary inference that Congress
intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the same
manner as any other public or private appropriator.” Id. (emphasis added).
The United States and Tribe argue that the Supreme Court’s explanation of how the
Winters reserved water rights doctrine was applied to another federal reservation of land in New
Mexico, and indeed the court’s New Mexico decision does not apply to this case. Presumably,
this argument encompasses the many Winters implied reserved water right decisions of this
Court that are ignored by the United States’ and Tribe’s briefs on appeal to this Court. As
explained herein, the United States and Tribe are wrong.
B.

Idaho’s Extensive Case Law on Federal Reserved Water Rights Precludes the
Claims Asserted by United States and Tribe in this Appeal.
This Court has addressed federal reserved water right claims on many occasions, both

through the SRBA court proceedings and in the Avondale litigation from the 1970s. In the first
Avondale decision, this Court required the United States to file its reserved water right claims in
the Coeur d’Alene National Forest in a general water rights adjudication. Avondale Irr. Dist. v.
North Idaho Properties, Inc., 96 Idaho 1, 523 P.2d 818 (1974). In the second Avondale decision,
this Court described the Winters reserved water rights doctrine:
Although originating in a case concerning water rights on an Indian reservation,
Winters v. United States, supra, this reserved right doctrine has been held to apply
to other federal enclaves including national forests. Cappaert v. United States,
supra\ United States v. District Court for Eagle County, supra; Arizona v.
California, supra.
Avondale Irr. Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, Inc., 99 Idaho 30, 35, 577 P.2d 9, 14 (1978);
accord United States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 529, 988 P.2d 1199, 1203 (1999). In
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other words, this Court has applied the same principles underlying Winters to other federal
reservations of land where reserved water rights are claimed.
In the decision approving the commencement of the SRBA, this Court explained in detail
the nature of a federal reserved water right:
‘reserved’ rights are those rights reserved, either expressly or implied, by United
States and are exempt from appropriation. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908). Generally, those rights consist of those rights
reserved by treaty with the Indians. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S.
545, 103 S.Ct. 3201, 77 L.Ed. 2d. 837 (1983); see also In re Rights to Use Water
in Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyoming 1988), affirmed by an equally divided
court 492 U.S. 406,109 S.Ct. 2994,106 L.Ed. 2d. 3342 (1989); State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Lewis, 88 New Mexico 636, 545 P.2d 1014 (1976). But these rights
also include those obtained by the United States prior to granting statehood to a
territory by the Riparian Doctrine or for purposes of maintaining applicable
stream flows, United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 19
S.Ct. 770,43 L.Ed. 1136 (1899); and other rights created by the U.S. when it held
land as a territory, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662,49 L.Ed.
1089(1905).
Idaho Department of Water Resources v. United States, 122 Idaho 116,120, n. 3,836 P.2d 289,
293, n. 3 (1992). Thus, Winters applies both to Indian reservations and other federal reservations.
!

Since Avondale and the SRBA commencement decision, this Court has had the
opportunity to address federal reserved water rights claims in a case involving springs withdrawn
for stock watering under an Executive Order, known as Public Water Reserve 107 (PWR 107),
United States v. State, 131 Idaho 468, 959 P.2d 449 (1998); claims to reserved water rights on
national forest land under the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA), United
States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 988 P.2d 1199 (1999); claims for reserved water rights
under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 912, 12 P.3d
1256 (2000); claims for reserved water rights under the lands designated as wilderness under the
Wilderness Act and for water in the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area Act, Potlatch Corp.
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v. United States, 134 Idaho 916, 12 P.3d 1260 (2000) (on rehearing); and the Deer Flat Wildlife
Refuge, United States v. State, 135 Idaho 655,23 P.3d 117 (2001).
Some of these decisions recognize a reserved right. Some do not. But each opinion
carefully examines the reserved rights doctrine. Inexplicably, the Tribe and the United States
essentially ignore this Court’s reserved water rights decisions, even though these opinions
address the scope of the reserved rights doctrine in ways that guide us to the correct resolution of
the reserved water rights claims before this Court today.
Thus, in Avondale II, supra, this Court noted that a reserved water right is based on a
reservation of land and vests on the date of the reservation. 99 Idaho at 34, 577 P.2d at 13. Thus,
any Winters right can only have a priority date of the date of the reservation, not “time
immemorial” as the United States and Tribe claim here. This Court relied on the Winters
reserved rights doctrine and explained that under this doctrine, the United States “is entitled to
such a water right only if, and only to the extent it ‘is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation, no more.’” (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976)). This
Court recognized that the Organic Act accommodated many other public uses of water that could
be defeated by a reserved water right. 99 Idaho at 36, 577 P.2d at 15. This Court further
emphasized that the purpose of the reservation had to be determined by the law at the time of the
reservation of land and not by later discovered “supplemental” purposes. Id. A reserved water
right is not based on an equitable balancing of competing interests but instead on the purpose of
the reservation at the time it was created - “no more and no less.” Id.
In the PWR 107 decision, this Court examined contemporaneous historical documents
making it clear that the purpose of PWR 107 “was to retain title to and supervision of such
springs and water holes.” 131 Idaho at 472, 959 P.2d 453 (emphasis added). That was
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unambiguous evidence of an intent to reserve water in the Executive Order. Here, no party
claims there are any historical documents asserting the need to “retain title” to any water for the
Tribe, on or off the reservation. With respect to the off-reservation claims, which include the
northern two-thirds of the Lake, the Tribe unequivocally ceded all title off the reservation,
clearly indicating that there was no implied intent to “retain title” to water rights or any other
rights off the reservation.
This Court, in the MUSYA appeal, reiterated that the reserved water right doctrine arises
from Winters. 133 Idaho at 529, 988 P.2d at 1203. This Court held that when the United States
claims an implied reserved water right, such a right must be necessary for the purposes of the
reservation, that the necessity must be so great that without that water the reservation would be
entirely defeated and that water valuable for a secondary purpose of the reservation must be
acquired under State law. Id. at 529 and 531-32, 988 P.2d at 1203 and 1205-06. The Court
evaluated the legislative history of the MUSYA Act and found nothing implying an intent to
:

reserve water. Id. The same is true of Congress’ 1891 Act approving the agreements with the
Coeur d’Alene Tribe. Neither the Tribe nor the United States point to any legislative history
behind that act, referring to water rights or the need for water rights.
The Potlatch cases involving the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the Wilderness Act and the
Hells Canyon National Recreation Area evaluate the reserved rights claims based on
contemporaneous legislative intent, as expressed in the language of the Acts. 134 Idaho at 914,
and 134 Idaho at 919. In the Wilderness Act decision, this Court reviewed Winters and explained
that it involved a situation where that Tribe would be left with land not “fit for habitation” unless
there was an implied water right for the land reserved, 134 Idaho at 920, 12 P.3d at 1264. In
:

Winters, giving the Tribe land without water would defeat the very purpose of the reservation. Id.
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That is the measure of Winters. Is the water right necessary to make the land “fit for habitation”?
If the land is not “fit for habitation,” the reservation would be entirely defeated. In this case,
there is absolutely no evidence that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation would not be “fit for
habitation” and “entirely defeated” without the implied reserved water rights claimed here. This
is especially true for the off-reservation instream flow claims.
The Tribe argues that this Court’s Wilderness Act decision holds that implied reserved
water rights for Indian reservations and implied reserved water rights for other federal lands must
be evaluated under different legal tests. Tribe Brief, pp. 31-32. The Tribe then bootstraps that
argument to wave off the relevance of the reserved rights case of United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696 (1978). This argument fails for many reasons. First, the Supreme Court itself cited
Winters in United States v. New Mexico as the legal basis for the United States’ authority to
reserve unappropriated water for use on appurtenant lands withdrawn from the public domain.
438 U.S. at 699. Second, as shown above, this Court also relies on Winters as the basis for the
implied reserved rights doctrine for other federal land reservations. Third, this Court examined
the differences between the factual background underlying creation of the Fort Belknap
Reservation in Winters and the facts underlying the Wilderness Act. This Court held that
Congress had not taken the necessary steps to allow the Court to find a reserved water right. In
other words, the Winters test is alive, but it was not satisfied with respect to the facts behind the
Wilderness Act or designation of particular areas as wilderness.
More telling is this Court’s explanation that in Winters “there would be no consideration
for the agreement if the tribes gave up land and did not receive the benefit of the water to make
the land habitable.” 134 Idaho at 920 (emphasis added). The CSRBA district court made no
finding or determination that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation land would not be “habitable” or
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not “fit for habitation,” with respect to any of the reserved water rights granted to the United
States for the Tribe. The CSRBA district court stopped its analysis with identifying the “primary
purposes” of the reservation, and did not take the next step and ask the hard question, i.e.,
without water for that primary purpose, would the reservation not be “fit for habitation” or
“entirely defeated”? The United States and Tribe failed to offer any evidence of what water
rights were necessary for a “habitable” reservation. Other than domestic use, the rest of these
reserved water right claims, under the facts of this case, do not come close to meeting that
“habitable” standard. Critically, the off-reservation instream flow claims are not based on an
assertion that the Reservation would not be “habitable.” They are based on the claim that some
species of fish migrate from parts of the Lake to off reservation areas.
The Deer Flat decision points out several other factors that are important in evaluating
reserved rights claims. This Court continued to adhere to the rule that to obtain a valid reserved
water right, the United States must show that the lack of such a right would defeat the purpose of
the reservation. 135 Idaho at 663, 23 P.3d at 125. Significantly, this Court also observed,
“[hjowever, simply reserving an area of land where certain species are attracted, without more,
does not constitute a reservation of water.” Id. Yet, that is precisely the basis for the United
States’ claims for instream flow (on and off the reservation), wetlands and lake levels - reserving
an area of land where certain species might be attracted. The Deer Flat decision also provides
that even if the purpose of the reservation has evolved over time, those evolved purposes cannot
be the basis for a reserved water right. As this Court has held, “[pjresent day desires cannot be
imposed as purposes on past decision if those purposes were not present at the time of the
reservation.” Id. at 664, 23 P.3d at 126.
//

!
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C.

The United States Supreme Court Decisions do not Support these Implied Reserved
Water Rights Claims.
These reserved rights claims expressly rely on Winters. R. 363. Yet, the facts behind

Winters are a far cry from the facts behind the Coeur d’Alene Reservation. In 1888, the Fort
Belknap Reservation was established in Montana. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565. At that time, the
United States and Indians grazed large herds of horses and cattle on the Reservation. Id. at 566.
The agricultural lands were productive, but “in order to make them productive, require [d] large
quantities of water for the purpose of irrigating them.” Id. Both the United States and the Indians
immediately diverted and used water to irrigate about 30,000 acres of land for crops of grain,
grass and vegetables. Id. Thereafter, the Defendants diverted water that had previously been used
to irrigate the Reservation lands. Id. at 567-70.
The Court held that the case “turns on” the agreement creating the Fort Belknap
Reservation. Id. at 575. The Court noted the policy of the government at that time was to change
the Indians’ habits so they would become a pastoral and civilized people. Id. at 576. The lands
reserved, without irrigation, were “practically valueless.” Id. Under those facts, the Court held
that when the Tribe ceded lands outside the boundaries, there was an implication that waters
!

necessary for agriculture were reserved for the on-reservation lands. Id.
Contrast the facts of Winters with those of this case. On the Coeur d’Alene Reservation,
the agricultural lands are, and have always been, dry-land farming. There was no large-scale
effort to irrigate the Coeur d’Alene Reservation lands to grow crops. All the pastoral and
agricultural efforts of the members of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, and they were both significant
and admirable, were obtained without any significant irrigation. The Reservation lands were not
“practically valueless” without irrigation.
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Winters also recognizes that the intent of the reservation of land arises in the context of
the policies of the government at the time of the reservation. As Winters explains, that policy was
to change the habits of a nomadic people so they would become pastoral. 207 U.S. at 576. Doing
so involved a smaller tract of land, and if water was necessary to carry out that purpose on the
smaller tract through irrigation, then water for irrigation would be implied. Id. Here, the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe explained that they needed to hunt and fish for “a while” because they were “not
as yet quite up to living on farming.” Idaho v. United States, supra, 533 U.S. at 266. (emphasis
added).
Members of the Tribe applied themselves to agriculture and established valuable farms,

1

I

all without diverting water for irrigation. While hunting and fishing were recognized at the time
of the reservation as pursuits that the members would engage in for “a while,” 533 U.S. at 266,
those pursuits were not the reason for the Reservation. To the contrary, hunting and fishing were

1

transitional to pastoral and agricultural pursuits, even in the minds of the Tribe, as they expressed
at the time. Id. Likewise, there is nothing to imply that water had to be preserved for all time to
support those pursuits on or off the Reservation in order to prevent the lands set aside for the
Reservation from being “practically valueless.” Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) was another case where Indian tribes were
awarded implied reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine. Those claims involved lands
along the Colorado River, and “most of the lands were of the desert kind - hot, scorching sands.”
Id. at 599. The Court again noted, citing congressional documentation from the 1860s, that
“[irrigating canals are essential to the prosperity of these Indians.” Id. The court in Arizona
characterized its holding in Winters as concluding that the United States, in creating the
reservation, “intended to deal fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the water without
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which their lands would have been useless.” Id. at 600. (emphasis added). Here, the Tribe and
United States do not contend that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation would have been “useless”
without irrigation.
In 1976, the Supreme Court applied the reserved rights doctrine to a reservation of
Devil’s Hole to preserve an underground pool of water. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128
(1976). The court stated that “[t]he doctrine applies to Indian reservation and other federal
enclaves.” Id. at 138. The Court held that, where the proclamation creating the reserve recited
that “the pool” should be given special protection, the proclamation showed an intent to reserve a
water right to protect the pool. Id. at 140. The Court even found this language to be an explicit
reservation rather than implied. Id.
In Cappaert, the Court relied on Indian reserved water rights cases of Winters and
Arizona v. California, supra. This reliance belies the argument that Cappaert’s reserved water
right derives from a different legal source than the Indian reservation reserved right cases.
Moreover, the Court also reiterated that the amount of water was limited to the minimum amount
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservoir, citing to the Indian reserved water rights case of
Arizona v. California. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141. Clearly, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that both Indian and other federal reservations are to be analyzed in the same way
when searching for an implied reserved water right.
Yet, the Tribe argues that United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), a reserved

!

water rights case for a reservation of federal land, “does not apply.” Tribe Brief, p. 31. The
United States argues that this Court should “wholly reject application of New Mexico in the
Indian water rights context.” U.S. Brief, p. 14, n. 4. Before rejecting New Mexico, based on the
United States and Tribe’s imploring, the Court should revisit the opinion. The United States
!

I
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Supreme Court begins its opinion by citing to Winters and Arizona v. California as the bases for
the “implied reservation of water doctrine.” New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 698-700.
In New Mexico, the court stated that:
Each time this Court has applied the “implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,” it
has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for
which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the purposes of
the reservation would be entirely defeated.
438 U.S. at 700. Immediately preceding this quote, the court referred to both Cappaert, supra,
and Arizona v. California, supra, a non-Indian and an Indian reservation. More telling is footnote
4 to the court’s opinion which sets out the cases referred to in this quote. Footnote 4 sets out a
detailed summary of Winters, Arizona v. California and Cappaert, and draws no distinction
among the legal test applied to these Indian and non-Indian reservations. After citing both types
of reservations, the court concluded that Congress’ express deference to State water law, that a
reserved right would only arise when it is necessary for the “very purpose” of the reservation, but
when there is only a secondary purpose then Congress intended that water rights be acquired for
the reservation like any other appropriator. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
The United States Supreme Court could not be more clear. The primary-secondary
purpose test applies to all claims under the “implied-reservation-of-water doctrine.” There are
not two separate doctrines, as the Tribe and United States claim, no matter how much some
commentators would like to see a different outcome.
D.

The Winans Decision does not Support the Implied Reserved Water Right Claims
Made Here.
Both the United States and Tribe heavily rely on the United States Supreme Court

decision in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), to support their implied reserved water
right claims. Winans does not support these implied reserved water right claims. Winans is not
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even a reserved water right case, or a water rights case at all. Winans involved an interpretation
of the express language of a treaty with the Yakima Tribe. That treaty contained language
common to other Columbia River tribes, including the Nez Perce Tribe, that is completely absent
from any of the agreements with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. That language preserved the right to
take fish “at all usual and accustomed places” off the reservation in common with the citizens of
Washington Territory. Id. at 378.
Fish wheels constructed by non-Indians had excluded the Yakima from access to their
usual and accustomed fishing places, and suit was brought to enjoin the non-Indians from
interfering with that treaty right of access. The United States Supreme Court stated that the
“pivot of the controversy” was the construction of that language of the treaty. The Supreme
Court observed that the treaty was a grant of rights from the Tribe, and a reservation of rights
was not granted. Id. at 381. Thus, that treaty expressly reserved to the Tribe certain enumerable
rights outside the reservation boundaries to take fish at these usual and accustomed fishing
places. Id.
The Yakima Treaty and the Coeur d’Alene Treaty are markedly different in this respect.
The Coeur d’Alene Treaty does not mention fishing on or off the reservation. It contains no
reservation of the right to take fish at usual and accustomed places. It contains no reference to
access to fish at all. Rather, as we have seen, the Tribe ceded “all right and claim which they now
have, or ever had.. .except the portion of land within the boundaries of the present reservation.”
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 267 (2001). Thus, unlike the Yakima Tribe, the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe reserved nothing off the Reservation - no instream flow rights, not the northern
two-thirds of that great sheet of water - Lake Coeur d’Alene - nothing. As the court in Winans
recognized, “[t]he extinguishment of the Indian title, opening the land for settlement, and

i
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preparing the way for future states, were appropriate to the objects for which the United States
held the territory.” 198 U.S. at 384. As Winans recognizes, there could have been a reservation
of some of the Indians’ rights outside the reservation; but here there was not.
E.

Protection of Fish Habitat was Not a “Primary Purpose” of the Reservation, and
there are No Implied Reserved Water Rights for Off-Reservation Instream Flows.
The Coeur d’Alene Reservation was not established to protect fish habitat off the

Reservation. There is not a shred of historical evidence to support such a claim. Rather, the
historical record demonstrates that the Reservation was established to set aside agricultural land
that was protected from white settlement. See Section II.A., supra.
At the time, the Tribe was shifting to a more agrarian lifestyle. As stated in its 1872
petition requesting negotiations, the Tribe expressed a desire to increase agricultural practices,
I

and concluded that fishing would only be necessary for subsistence “for a while yet.” Idaho v.
United States, 533 U.S. 262,266 (2001) (“When the Tribe petitioned the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs a second time, it insisted on a reservation that included key river valleys because
‘we are not as yet quite up to living on farming’ and ‘for a while yet we need have some hunting
;I
!

and fishing.’”) This temporary desire for fishing on the Reservation for a while cannot support a

i

permanent water right, nor could the temporary, transitional phase be considered a primary
purpose of the Reservation, without which the Reservation would be entirely defeated.
Most telling is that none of the 1873, 1887 nor 1889 agreements make any reference to
fishing activities, fish habitat or fishing off the Reservation. At the time, treaties and agreements
with Indian tribes throughout the northwest explicitly dealt with fishing - both on and offreservation. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dept, of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Treaty “guaranteed the
right to fish ‘at all usual and accustomed places, in common with the citizens of Washington.’”);
i

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (same); Nez Perce Order, supra (same). If the
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United States, in the nineteenth century, intended to grant an implied water right for fish habitat
- such as the off-reservation instream flow claims at issue here - the United States or the Tribe
would have at least mentioned fishing in their agreements.

!

Here, the words of the agreements between the United States and Tribe are devoid of any
intent to preserve off-reservation fish habitat. Rather, negotiations clearly show that both parties
intended to reserve an agricultural preserve for the Tribe, free from interference from white
settlers, including mineral prospectors. Section II. A., supra. Given the clear intent of the
agreements, “[i]t is inconceivable that the United States would have intended or otherwise agreed
to allow the [Tribe] to reserve instream flow off-reservation water rights appurtenant to lands
intended to be developed” by white settlers. Nez Perce Order at 38.

i

The Tribe relinquished all of its “right, title and claim” to off-reservation lands. They did
so and were compensated. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 266 (2001). There was no
mention of fishing or habitat in either the agreements, executive orders or congressional
approvals. Supra. “It defies reason,” therefore, “to imply the existence of a water right that was
both never intended by the parties and inconsistent with the purpose of the Treaty.” Nez Perce
Order at 38.
When the CSRBA district court examined the history of negotiations and the Lake case
!

litigation, it concluded that on-reservation hunting and fishing was “a” purpose of the
Reservation. The CSRBA district court also held that off-reservation hunting and fishing rights

!

were inconsistent with the Tribe’s cession of all right, title and claims to off-reservation lands.
That latter conclusion is undoubtedly correct. However, under the Winters doctrine, the
conclusion that a water right for hunting and fishing can be implied under the facts of this case is
not.
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Hunting and fishing was no doubt culturally important, just as it was, and remains, to
many non-Indian cultures in Idaho. But Winters requires that the presence of a water right be
necessary, and without a water right that purpose would be “entirely defeated.” United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); United States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 529, 988 P.2d
1199, 1203 (1999). Hunting and fishing occurs all over the State without water rights. The
United States and Tribe have simply failed to prove that water right is necessary, even if hunting
and fishing is “a” primary purpose.
However, the historical evidence is clear, as discussed above, that hunting and fishing
were contemplated only “for a while” yet, while the tribal members transitioned to a pastoral,
agricultural economy. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 266. Even if a hunting and fishing case
could give right to a water right, it is inconceivable that a temporary use of that resource would
give rise to a permanent right prior in time and right to all other uses of the resource.
F.

The Plain Language of the Agreements Evidences the Tribe’s Intent to Cede “All
Right. Title and Claim” to Lands Outside of the Reservation.
The 1887 agreement provided that the Tribe would cede
all right title, and claim which they now have, or ever had, to all lands in said
Territories and elsewhere, except the portion of land within the boundaries of
their present reservation in the Territory of Idaho, known as the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation.

United States v. Idaho, 95 F.Supp.2d 1094,1096 (D. Idaho 1998). The 1891 ratification
recognized that:
For the consideration hereinafter stated the said Coeur d’Alene Indians hereby
cede, grant, relinquish, and quitclaim to the United States all right, title, and claim
which they now have, or ever had, to all lands.. .except.. .the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation.
Idaho v. Andrus, 720 F.2d 1461,1463 (9th Cir. 1983). This language is “precisely suited to
diminish reservation boundaries.” There is no limitation or exception to its scope. Id. at 1466.
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The claims for off-reservation instream flow rights are directly contrary to these
agreements. If the United States had impliedly intended to preserve any off-reservation “right,
title and claim” - such as an off-reservation instream flow claim - it could have, and should
have, done so through the agreements. See, for example, Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. 392 (Treaty in
question “guaranteed the right to fish ‘at all usual and accustomed place, in common with the
citizens of Washington’”); Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (same); Nez Perce Order, supra (same). As it
stands, however, the agreements are completely silent as to any fishing rights or fish habitat
(either on or off-reservation). The record is also completely devoid of any evidence that the
Reservation would be “practically worthless” or “useless” without off-reservation instream
flows.
G.

The United States Intended that Non-Indian Settlers Would Rely on the Agreement
to Cede “All Right, Title and Claim” Outside of the Reservation for Mineral
Development.
In light of the Tribe’s agreements to cede “all right, title and claim” outside of the

Reservation, and Congress’ confirmation of those agreements, settlers developed the ceded area.
Beginning in the 1860s, white settlers were developing mineral deposits in this area. R. 2347
(“The one thing that has given them [i.e. the Tribe] trouble has been fear of losing their homes.
They have watched the progress of white settlement in the surrounding county, the discovery of
valuable mines, the building of railroads, etc. etc.”); Id. (“It was feared in the early spring that
the great rush to the Coeur d’Alene gold mines would cause considerable trespassing upon their
reserve.”) In the 1880s, the Tribe became concerned with the mineral development interfering
with its lands and pushed for negotiations to establish a reservation. Idaho v. United States, 533
!

U.S. 262, 267 (2001). After the 1887 agreement, Congress received pressure from white settlers
seeking further mineral development opportunities and authorized further negotiations to
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determine whether additional Tribal land should be opened up for mineral development under
the “mineral laws of the United States.” United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067,1070 (9th Cir.
2000). The “mineral laws of the United States” included the Mining Act of 1866.
Long before negotiations with the Tribe began, the United States codified its intent to
recognize and protect mineral development and its associated water rights. The Mining Act of
1866 effectively opened public lands to mineral exploration and development. Act of July 26,
1866, 14 Stat. 253, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 51, 52 and 43 U.S.C. § 661. The Act included a
provision protecting water rights associated with mineral development. Act of July 26, 1866, 14
Stat. 253 {codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661) (“Whatever by priority of possession rights to the use of
water for mining.. .have vested and accrued.. .the possessors and owners of such vested rights
shall be maintained and protected in the same; and the right of way for the construction of
ditches and canals for the purposes herein specified is acknowledged and confirmed.”) A
subsequent 1870 amendment again confirmed the recognition and protection of water rights
associated with mineral development. Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218 {codified at 43 U.S.C. §
661) (“all patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested
and accrued water rights, or right to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water
rights, as may have been acquired.”) These statutes protect water rights associated with mineral
development into the future. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295
U.S. 142, 155 (1935) (The Acts of 1866 and 1870 “were not limited to recognizing pre-existing
rights of possession, but ‘ [t]hey reach into the future as well, and approve and confirm the policy
of appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the
legislation and judicial decisions of the arid land states, as the test and measure of private rights
in and to the nonnavigable waters on the public domain.’”)

HECLA LIMITED’S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE BRIEF

32

The United States knew of the protections afforded mineral development and water rights
for mineral development under these Acts when it was negotiating with the Tribe in the 1870s
and 1880s. Indeed, those negotiations were prompted, in large part, over the Tribe’s concerns
about mining claims by white settlers and with the specific purpose of acquiring the land from
the Tribe for mineral development. R. 2359 (January 23, 1888 Senate Resolution directing the
Secretary of the Interior to consider whether “it is advisable to throw any portion of such
reservation open to occupation and settlement under the mineral laws of the United States.”)
Considering these facts, the intent of both the Tribe and United States are clear. Neither
the Tribe nor the United States intended to maintain any off-reservation right to demand a certain
stream flow for fish habitat. Such an environmental servitude that would be used as a basis to
impede or prevent off-reservation mining activities was never contemplated. The settlers then
developed the mineral deposits, relying on the fact that all “right, title and claim” outside of the
Reservation was ceded by the Tribe.
y.

CONCLUSION

The miners and other settlers that came to North Idaho, came to what had previously been
Indian country in the aboriginal territory of the Coeur d’Alenes. Through a series of agreements,
i

executive orders and congressional actions, the Coeur d’Alenes gave up all claims outside their
Reservation. They did so understanding that they were destined to become agricultural, pastoral
and “civilized” people living on lands within specific reservation boundaries. Their agricultural
lands did not and do not require irrigation. The Reservation is not desert. The Reservation is not
“useless” without water rights for irrigation, hunting or fishing, or any other purpose. Hunting

i

and fishing was a temporary measure in the process of assimilation, not the basis for water rights
on, or off, the Reservation. Having failed to prove that any of their water right claims are
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necessary for the purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, it is error to imply from the United
States’ negotiations in the nineteenth century that the United States intended to reserve any water
rights for this particular reservation.
DATED this 13th day of April, 2018.
BARKER ROSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP
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